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Abstract 
The paper considers welfare effects of rent control when it is applied only in a sector of a 
rental housing market. In rent controlled sectors of the Danish rental housing market, we find 
welfare reducing overallocation of square meters between 9 and 17 per cent of actual 
allocations. Looking at the 20 per cent most overallocated households, the overallocation of 
square meters is between 42 and 92 per cent, and the estimated corresponding welfare loss 
ranges from 1.5 to 5.3 per cent of the average annual rent in the sectors. 
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1. Introduction 
In their paper The Misallocation of Housing under Rent Control, Glaeser and Luttmer (1997 
and 2003) point out that rent control on a perfectly competitive housing market incurs not 
only the well-known welfare loss from reduced supply, but also a welfare loss from 
misallocation among households of rent controlled dwellings. This result is demonstrated in a 
partial equilibrium model of a rental housing market with universal rent control. However, 
rent control is often implemented in a sector of the rental housing market with free rent setting 
in other sectors. Thus, the Los Angeles rent control law of 1978 exempted newly constructed 
units, see Fallis and Smith (1984), and rent control in Vancouver, British Colombia, exempted 
units built after 1974, see Marks (1984). In the New York case studied by Glaeser and 
Luttmer (2003) “rent-control regulations by and large exclude apartments in buildings with 
fewer than five apartments”. With such exemptions, a number of uncontrolled apartments will 
appear as perfect substitutes for controlled apartments, the only difference being the 
controlled rent. Other apartments will be less than perfect substitutes and yet other dwellings, 
like owned units, may be more distant substitutes. 
The Danish housing market has, with some modifications, kept rent control on the rental 
housing market since the beginning of the Second World War. Today, various exemptions 
have reduced the coverage of control to approximately 90 per cent of the rental market, which 
covers slightly less than half of the total housing in Denmark. Using a 20 per cent random 
sample from the Danish rental market, the paper seeks indications of welfare reducing 
misallocation in the controlled sectors based on relations estimated on observations from the 
uncontrolled sector. We find no tendency for net overallocation in the strictly rent controlled 
sectors of the market. Only in the market sector with damped rent there is net overallocation 
amounting to 6.3 per cent of actual allocations. The apparent lack of net overallocation in the 
strictly rent controlled sectors is explained by a restrictive administrative allocation system in 
supported housing, and because low rent in the private rent controlled sector makes the 
dwellings so attractive that households accept fewer square meters than demanded at the low 
rent, but still get a welfare gain compared to renting at market rent. However, when it comes 
to welfare reducing overallocations, we find overallocation of square meters between 9 and 17 
per cent of actual allocations. Moreover, looking at the 20 per cent most overallocated 
households, the overallocation is between 42 and 92 per cent and the estimated welfare loss 
ranges from 1.5 to 5.3 per cent of the average annual rent in the sectors.   3
The paper is structured as follows: Section two gives a brief overview of the Danish rental 
housing market. Section three illustrates welfare effects of rent control in a sector of a rental 
housing market, and section four has data description and estimates of determinants for the 
uncontrolled market rent and households’ demand of square meters area. Based on this, 
section five predicts market rents in the controlled sectors and compare household demand at 
this rent with actual allocations. Section six gives our conclusion. 
 
2. Rent control in Denmark 
The Danish rental housing market has been subject to rent control since the beginning of the 
Second World War. Initially, control was introduced because a steep increase in rents during 
the war was expected. After the war, it was envisaged that control would last only for a 
limited period until supply was restored; but rent control is still found in most cities today. In 
the supported housing sector
1 rents are fixed according to historical cost based rules, and this 
is also the case for many rentals with cooperative ownership
2. For rent controlled private 
rentals, the controlled rent is of second generation type and covers actual costs plus a “fair” 
interest on invested capital. Private rental housing built after 1991 has free market rent and 
this also includes newly established roof apartments in older buildings and apartments in 
buildings earlier used for commercial purposes. Moreover, around 130 out of 275 
municipalities, mostly covering smaller towns and agricultural land have no rent control for 
the private rental sector. In municipalities with rent control, private owners of buildings with 
less than 7 apartments and all thoroughly renovated apartments are exempted from cost based 
rent control. However, tenants can complain about a high rent, which may then be reduced by 
the local rent control board if the rent is significantly above the cost based rent in privately let 
apartments of similar size and quality located in surrounding and similar environments. We 
classify this rent as “damped rent”, see table 1. 
                                                 
1 The direct translation of the Danish name for this sector: almene boliger is general housing. We use the term 
supported housing in the following to underscore that the sector receives public support. The often used 
translation: social housing is somewhat misleading as the sector covers approximately 20 per cent of total 
housing in Denmark and thus much more than pure social housing. Vice President Bent Madsen (2006) from the 
Country Association of the Building Societies estimates that one fourth of the dwellings are for social housing. 
See also table 5 below on the household characteristics. 
2 In Danish: andelsboliger. The rent paid under cooperative ownership cannot be directly compared to the rent 
paid in other sectors of the market because cooperative tenants pay a comparatively low rent, which does not 
include interests on the capital invested in the bought share.   4
The various exemptions from control make it difficult to obtain precise data on the size of the 
controlled and uncontrolled rental housing sectors. Table 1 gives an indication of the 
distribution based on a 20 per cent sample randomly drawn from the Danish register data from 
the beginning of the year 2004. Lack of precise information on the number of thoroughly 
renovated old apartments has the consequence that the table overestimates the fraction of 
controlled private rentals. In broad terms, approximately 20 per cent of the Danish rental 
market is without direct rent control, but more than half of this has “damped rent”, leaving 
only approximately 8 per cent completely free of control. 
 
Table 1: Distribution of rental housing in Denmark based on a 20 per cent random sample. 
Market  Rental housing type 
Observations in 
sample (per cent) 
Observations with 
rent (per cent) 
Non private sector    126 316 (64)   
  - supported housing  93 887(48)  85 978 (92) 
  - coop ownership  32 429(16)  - 
Private sector    70 404 (36)  40 219 (57) 
  - controlled rent  31 333 (16)  26 365 (84) 
  - damped rent  24 217 (12)  8 993 (37) 
  - market rent  14 854 (8)  4 861 (33) 
Total
    196 720 (100)  126 197 (64) 
Notes: In the table, private housing let at market rent consists of housing units either built after 1991, or situated 
in municipalities with no rent control. Private housing let at damped rent consists of housing units in small 
buildings (6 or less apartments per building) in municipalities with rent control.  
Source: A 20 per cent random sample from register data on Danish dwellings and households from January 
2004. 
 
The table also shows the number of observations in the sample where information on the rent 
paid in the year 1999 (in bracket as a per cent of the total sample observations) is available. 
The paid rent is drawn from a register used for real estate valuation. Every fourth year
3, a 
number of owners were asked to report the rent for their let dwellings. The purpose was to 
provide tax authorities with information for real estate valuation and seems to imply that 
owners with many housing units (owners primarily in the controlled sectors) have been 
chosen. This explains part of the difference in the coverage between the controlled and the 
uncontrolled sectors. Another part of the difference between the two columns is due to the 
                                                 
3 After 1999, a hedonic valuation system based on real estate market prices has been used.    5
fact that we do not have rent information for housing units build after 1999 and as a 
consequence newly build housing units are excluded from the last column. 
 
3. Welfare effects of misallocation of rent controlled housing units 
A graphical treatment of the welfare loss from misallocation under a universal maximum 
price on a competitive market seems first presented by Ng (1979) and later by Glaeser (1996) 
and Glaeser and Luttmer (1997 and 2003). Glaeser and Luttmer (2003) note that “in the 
housing context, this may mean that some individuals own, rather than rent, or if there is an 
uncontrolled section, these individuals rent in that section”. They do not, however, consider 
rent control in a sector of a homogenous rental housing market. Figure 1 supplements their 
analysis with this case. All other markets, including some housing markets, can be ignored in 
the welfare analysis, and furthermore, distorting elements, like trading costs, taxation, etc., are 
assumed away. Heterogeneous households demand housing units along the horizontal axis H, 
and diminishing marginal valuation explains the negative slope of the demand curve D, with 
rent r on the vertical axis. With no income effects assumed, Marshall’s consumer surplus is 
used to demonstrate welfare effects of rent control. Control is introduced only in a sector of 
the market equal to the supply between O and Hc. The rent controlled units are picked in 
accordance with control legislation, but are placed to the left in the figure for illustrative 
convenience. The controlled rent is rc, which is below the equilibrium rent r0 before control is 
introduced. As pointed out by Glaeser and Luttmer (2003), a rationing mechanism, e.g. 
queuing, lottery, nepotism, etc., will allocate housing in the controlled sector in a way such 
that households who value housing the most cannot be sure to become tenants of the 
controlled dwellings. If rent controlled units are allocated perfectly randomly
4, demand 
satisfied in the controlled sector follows the dashed line Ah in this sector of the market, and 
the residual not satisfied demand is equal to the horizontal distance between this line and the 
total demand curve D. The residual demand appears in the uncontrolled or free market sector 
to the right of Hc as a dashed demand curve, and the equilibrium in the free sector shifts from 
E to E' with a supply of uncontrolled units measured by the distance HcH1. The resulting free 
rent is rf, which is above both the earlier free rent r0 and the controlled rent rc. Note that the 
“original” demand curve D in the free sector coincides with the “residual” demand curve 
                                                 
4 Fallis and Smith (1984) provide a thorough description of possible allocations and implications of rent control. 
Here only random allocation is treated.    6
under perfect rationing
5 in the controlled sector. Thus, there is no change of demand in the 
free sector under perfect rationing and the equilibrium remains unchanged at E.  
 
























Compared to the exposition by Glaeser and Luttmer (2003), the figure illustrates additional 
important aspects of the welfare effects of rent control when it is applied only in a sector of 
the market. One is that equilibrium in the free sector shifts from E to E' because of the 
introduction of rent control with random allocation. As stated earlier, this would not be the 
case if allocation in the controlled sector was perfect or generated by free market forces, e.g. 
if trade among tenants of controlled and uncontrolled housing units was allowed. The random 
allocation increases the demand because controlled housing units - over the line segment ig - 
are allocated randomly among all households who value housing above the controlled rent rc. 
This pushes demand into the free sector and induces a higher free rent, which incurs an 
increase of the non-controlled supply. The increased free rent corresponds to empirical 
                                                 
5 Perfect rationing requires that the households who value housing the most get the controlled supply.   7
observations by Fallis and Smith (1984) and Marks (1984)
6. Moreover, some households who 
value housing above the new free rent rf, but are “pushed” out of the controlled sector, find 
housing in the free sector corresponding to the supply HcH1 and obtain a consumer surplus in 
the free sector. Therefore, among these households the welfare loss is equal to the increase of 
the rent from r0 to rf, but this loss is a gain for landlords supplying HcH1in the free sector. 
However, the expanded output H0H1 is provided at higher costs than valued by households in 
case of no misallocation. The welfare loss, equal to the area EeE', thus appears because of the 
larger demand following from the random allocation. Finally, allocation of the controlled 
apartments over the line segment ag, i.e. among households who value housing below the rent 
rf, has a welfare reducing effect. Here efficient allocation would give a consumer surplus 
below the line segment ab - a line segment horizontally cut out of the demand curve D - and 
above rc, whereas random allocation only gives a consumer surplus below the dashed line 
segment ah and above rc. The welfare loss from misallocation among these households is thus 
the area abh, which can be added to the area EeE' to get the total welfare loss from 
misallocation. 
 
It should be noted that the size of the area abh depends on the market size or supply of 
housing units in the free sector. To see this, take the vertical total short run supply curve Sshort 
at the level H1 through E' and imagine that this supply curve moves to the left. The rent rf (and 
the crossing points a and b) will go up and the area abh will increase. Finally, the short run 
supply curve Sshort coincides with Sc when all supply is under rent control, and the area abh 
will be maximum and equal to the area ABh
7. This is the case when rent control is universal 
and there is no supply of uncontrolled substitutes on the market. The exercise tells us that we 
should expect a higher rent in the uncontrolled sector the larger the rent controlled fraction of 
a rental housing market is. 
 
The analysis has assumed that existing rent controlled units stay on the market after the 
introduction of control, and that this - with random allocation - leads to an increase in total 
supply. This is opposite to the conventional supply reaction to the introduction of a universal 
maximum price on a competitive market. On a homogenous rental housing market with rent 
control applied in a sector of the market, the shown rise in supply in figure 1 may occur in the 
                                                 
6 Besides Fallis and Smith (1984), see Hubert (1993) and Häckner and Nyberg (2000) for other market structures 
where the free rent does not increase under rent control. 
7 The area ABh is equal in size to the area GAEF shown in figure 2 in Glaeser and Luttmer (2003).   8
short to medium run. In the long run housing capital lasts only when the total production costs 
are covered by rents and, as documented by Gyourko and Linneman (1990), if profit is 
negative under control, the housing supplied can be expected to gradually deteriorate until it is 
ready for demolition
8. As a consequence, housing in the controlled sector may totally vanish 
in the long run, and the welfare loss becomes severe. On the other hand, if politicians want to 
keep the rent controlled housing units on the market; an option is to subsidize rent controlled 
housing. In Denmark, various kinds of housing subsidies, of which public supported housing 
gets a fair share, exist and support rent controlled housing supply in the long run. 
 
4. Estimating rents and demand 
Our aim is to find the degree of misallocation among households in the controlled sector of 
the Danish rental market or, more precisely, the amount of allocated square meters that 
surpasses demand, had the housing unit been rented in the uncontrolled or market sector of 
the market. We cannot follow the method used by Glaeser and Luttmer (2003), who are able 
to compare similar towns with and without rent control, because we only have a limited 
number of observations from towns without rent control. Referring to figure 1, misallocation 
occurs among households who get rent controlled housing units in spite of the fact that they 
do not value housing as high as the market rent, i.e. rf corresponding to the equilibrium E´. 
Our observations come from the demand curve going through E´, which is influenced by the 
existence of a rent controlled sector
9, and not from the D-curve in the figure. By using data 
corresponding to the equilibrium E´ and using the rent rf, we expect to include more 
misallocated households, than found under the equilibrium price r0 in the counterfactual 
without rent control. Fallis and Smith (1984) and Marks (1984) found an increase of the 
uncontrolled rent after introduction of rent control, but we cannot be sure that this always 
happens because some households may prefer an offer with reduced space and a low rent in 
the controlled sector to an offer in the market sector with more space and a higher rent. We 
take a closer look at this in section five. 
 
Households’ demand for rental housing is measured in square meters. To avoid simultaneity 
bias in our demand estimation, the standard two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation 
procedure is used, where the rent per square meter is instrumented by a set of identifying 
                                                 
8 Some types of second generation rent control allow letting at the free market rent after vacancy. This is not the 
case in Denmark. See Arnott (1995) for an overview of various types of rent control. 
9 Demand is also influenced by the existence of co-op housing etc.   9
variables for the supply of rental housing. The available data make it possible to calculate the 
actual paid rent per square meter space for the rented dwellings with some limitations. One is 
that the reported rent is from the year 1999. This implies that all dwellings built after this year 
are excluded from the sample, but also that one must expect some differences between 
dwelling characteristics for 2003 and the actual characteristics in 1999. We do not consider 
this to be a serious problem, but obviously some dwellings have been better equipped over the 
years implying that the reported rent may be too low for these dwellings and this tends to give 
a downward bias for coefficients on some variables. Another issue is that of no or incorrect 
reported data on rents for a number of dwellings. Observations with a monthly rent for the 
apartment below 180 DKK (~ 24 USD) are supposed to be erroneous. This is also the case for 
a monthly rent is above 500 DKK (~ 67 USD) per square meter, if the area is below 18 square 
meters, and for building years 0 and 1. Also households with negative income are excluded 
from the regressions
10. This cleaning reduces the number of market rent observations used in 
the regression from 4,861 in table 1 to 4,653 observations in table 2
11. Finally, the households 
occupying the dwelling in year 2003 may be different from those who occupied the dwellings 
in 1999. The assumption behind our regression is that the distribution of rents remains 
unchanged over the four year time span so that e.g. a high rent dwelling in 1999 also is a high 
rent dwelling in 2003. 
 
Table 2 shows some characteristics of the dwellings with data on the paid rent. There is a 
clear difference between the market rent and rent in the other sectors. Part of this may be 
explained by difference in the underlying characteristics of dwellings, i.e. the age of the 
building, and the degree of urbanization etc. The following estimations will take account of 
this. The market rent sector is somewhat overrepresented in the medium urbanized areas and 
underrepresented in the completely urbanized areas. Table A.1 and A.2 in the appendix 





                                                 
10 The income data are primarily based on fillings by the employer, who is responsible for the payment of 
income taxes. To this is added capital income, which may be negative.  
11 For comparison: Statistics Denmark calculates the rent level for use in the Danish consumer price index based 
on a random sample of 4,200 let dwellings.   10
Table 2: Characteristics of dwellings in the cleaned sample 
 Private  sector  Supported  housing 
Market rent  Damped rent  Controlled rent 
Variable  Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean. 
Rent per sqm.  4,653  570.0  8,099  477.1  25,427  475.8  81,484  484.6 
Area  4,646 74.3 8,062 79.8  25,255  72.9 81,402 76.2 
Age  of  building  4,649 42.2 8,097 88.9  25,427  64.8 81,484 31.8 
Semi attached building  4,653 0.26 8,099 0.04  25,427  0.05 81,484 0.25 
Detached building  4,653 0.04 8,099 0.04  25,427  0.01 81,484 0.02 
Built-up roof  4,532 0.07 8,016 0.09  25,208  0.18 80,924 0.21 
Vacancy rate  4,653  6.83 8,099 5.49  25,427 4.56 81,484 4.54 
Completely urbanized
  4,653 0.19 8,099 0.43  25,427  0.76 81,484 0.60 
Highly urbanized  4,653 0.23 8,099 0.36  25,427  0.17 81,484 0.25 
Medium urbanized  4,653 0.51 8,099 0.20  25,427  0.06 81,484 0.12 
Low urbanized  4,653 0.07 8,099 0.01  25,427  0.01 81,484 0.01 
Notes: Obs. is the number of observations. Rent per sqm. is annual rent in DKK (1999) per square meter area. 
Dummy variables are in italics and take the value 1 if correct. Urbanization is based on the percentage of 
inhabitants in the municipality in urban areas. 
 
 
The results of the first stage estimation on observations from the market rent sector are shown 
in table 3. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the rent per square meter. The 
first 2 variables in the table are the instruments for supply. The vacancy rate is measured as 
the average per cent over the five years up to 1998 of rental dwellings where no household is 
connected to the address in the register. It is calculated for 296 municipalities. This instrument 
is believed to be without influence on the demanded number of square meters. The second 
instrument is the type of roofing; it takes the value 1 when the building has built-up roof. The 
roofing chosen is expected to have an impact on construction costs. A Sargan test for over-
identifying restrictions does not reject the use of this variable as an instrument for supply (the 
chi2 value is 1.65 and the p-value of rejection 0.19). The other explanatory variables are those 
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Table 3: Determinants of the ln of rent per square meter 
Variable Coefficient  t  stats. 
Vacancy rate  -0.008***  -3.93 
Built-up roof  0.066***  2.66 
Age of building  -0.005***  -12.05 
Age of building squared  0.000***  7.07 
Attached building  reference  
Semi attached building  0.063***  4.40 
Detached building  -0.369***  -9.36 
Tenure length  -0.010***  -6.01 
Tenure length squared  0.000***  3.14 
ln income per equivalent person  0.057***  4.87 
Number of equivalent persons  -0.155***  -7.38 
Number of equivalent persons squared  0.018***  3.29 
Age of breadwinner  -0.005  -2.88 
Age of breadwinner squared  0.000  3.20 
No education  reference   
Short education  -0.002  -0.13 
Long education  -0.022  -0.92 
Wage earner  reference   
Self employed  0.036  0.84 
Undergoing education  -0.021  -0.88 
Pre pensioner  0.047**  2.12 
Social pensioner  0.052**  2.32 
Early pensioner  -0.012  -0.29 
Old age pensioner  0.007  0.23 
Immigrant 0.065***  2.83 
Single reference   
Married -0.002  -0.11 
Divorced -0.027  -1.45 
Widow -0.046**  -2.09 
Completely urbanized  reference   
Highly urbanized  -0.127***  -6.92 
Medium urbanized  -0.193***  -8.91 
Low urbanized  -0.188***  -5.70 
Constant 6.237***  38.70 
Number of observations  4496   
  F  = 62.08***    R
2 = 0.28   12
Notes: Regression based on observations from the sector with market rent. Significance at 1% level: ***; 
significance at 5% level: **; significance at 10% level: *. Personal characteristics are those of the breadwinner 
of the household.  
 
The second stage regression uses the predicted rent from the above relation as explanatory 
variable. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of square meters area. 
Table 4 shows regression coefficients and z statistics. It shows that the age of the building is 
without significant influence on the demanded number of square meters space, but the 
demanded square meters is lower in semi attached buildings and higher in detached buildings 
and falls with tenure length. The rent elasticity is -0.305, indicating that a ten percent increase 
in the rent will reduce the number of demanded square meters with 3 per cent. The variable 
income per equivalent person covers the household’s disposable income divided by the 
number of equivalent persons, i.e. (the number of adults + 0.6 times the number of children) 
raised to the power 0.8. For this variable, a positive income elasticity of 0.108 is found for the 
demanded number of square meters area, implying that a ten percent increase in the income 
per equivalent person will increase the demanded number of square meters by one per cent. 
The concept income per equivalent person probably comes close to the calculation that 
households - and financial advisors – make when they calculate a household’s residual 
income available for housing consumption. Naturally, demand increases with the number of 
persons in the household, but the percentage increase per equivalent person falls with more 
persons in the household. More education raises demand and compared to the average wage 
earner, it is low when the household head is undergoing education and high for self employed 
household heads and pensioners, except for social pensioners. Being an immigrant has no 
significant effect on demand, but being married reduces demand, whereas widows tend to 
have higher demand. Finally, the more urbanized the environment is, the higher is the demand 









   13
Table 4: Determinants of the ln of the demand for square meters 
Variable Coefficient  z  stats. 
Age of building  -0.0001  -0.18 
Age of building squared  3.68e-06  1.06 
Attached building  reference  
Semi attached building  -0.030**  -2.06 
Detached building  0.193***  3.01 
Tenure length  -0.005**  -2.42 
Tenure length squared  0.00005***  2.52 
Predicted ln rent per square meter  -0.305*  -1.84 
ln income per equivalent person  0.108***  6.29 
Number of equivalent persons  0.454***  12.65 
Number of equivalent persons squared  -0.052***  -5.62 
Age of breadwinner  0.019***            10.77 
Age of breadwinner squared  -0.0001***           -8.19 
No education  reference   
Short education  0.062***  6.17 
Long education  0.077***  4.31 
Wage earner  reference   
Self employed  0.084**  2.25 
Undergoing education  -0.218***  -7.22 
Social pensioner  -0.045*  -1.72 
Pre pensioner  0.037**  2.01 
Early pensioner  0.012  0.44 
Old age pensioner  0.041*  1.82 
Immigrant -0.037  -1.58 
Single reference   
Married -0.026*  -1.81 
Divorced 0.008  0.55 
Widow 0.095***  5.66 
Completely urbanized  reference   
Highly urbanized  -0.058**  -2.02 
Medium urbanized  -0.088**  -2.13 
Low urbanized  -0.110**  -2.39 
Constant 3.843***  3.61 
Number of observations  4511   
Wald chi
2 = 3512.73***   R
2 = 0.52 
Notes: Regression based on observations from the sector with market rent. Significance at 1% level: ***; 
significance at 5% level: **; significance at 10% level: *. 
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The demand relation found in table 4 is in the following used to predict the quantity 
demanded for households in the other sectors of the rental market with insertion of their 
individual characteristics and the paid rent. This may raise a problem with a selection bias. 
Biased coefficients may occur if the various control variables in table 4 do not capture all 
idiosyncratic differences between households with respects to their housing demand. An 
impression of similarities and differences between households on the Danish rental housing 
market is provided by table 5. It is clear from the table that low household incomes are 
concentrated in the supported housing sector. But with a median disposable income in this 
sector 13 per cent below the median income in the market sector there should be an 
acceptable overlap of disposable incomes between households in uncontrolled and rent 
controlled sectors. Looking at the number of children, only the private controlled sector stands 
out with comparatively few children. Of course, this crude comparison between sectors does 
not in any way exclude a selection bias of the coefficients in table 4. 
 
 
Table 5: Household income and number of children in rental housing in Denmark 
Type of rental housing 
Median disp. 
income 
Per cent  of total 
median disp. income 
Mean number of 
children 
Non private secctor       
  - supported housing  123 509  97  0.44 
Private sector       
  - controlled rent  129 924  102  0.16 
  - damped rent  136 752  108  0.37 
  - market rent  141 455  111  0.40 
Total 126  925  100  0.37 
Notes: See notes to table 1. Disposable income in DKK for year 2003. 
 
5. Do households in rent controlled housing get superfluous area? 
Figure 1 showed a rental market with controlled rent in a sector of the market. With random 
allocation of controlled housing units, excess demand was pushed into the free market sector. 
The figure and the surrounding text assumed households were able to get the demanded 
number of square meters at the offered price. However, in both the controlled and the 
uncontrolled sectors of the market, households must often accept an offered number of square 
meters in combination with a given rent, which deviates from their optimal quantity demand 
at this rent. As pointed out by Hubert (1993), households who are offered a limited amount of   15
square meters in rent controlled sectors are more inclined to accept fewer than demanded 
square meters because of the lower rent. 
 


























This result is illustrated in figure 2 panel a, where the dashed line from y illustrates the budget 
restriction under controlled rent, and the solid more negatively sloped line illustrates the 
budget restriction under free market rent. The two goods in the utility function are housing h 
and other consumption c. With other consumption having the price 1, y is the real value of 
household income measured in units of other consumption. Housing demand is assumed to be 
a normal good with an increasing demand when the rent is falling. Therefore, the demand 
increases from h1 to h3 when the rent falls from rf to rc. However, if the household is offered 
only the amount hc of controlled housing to the rent rc this offer is accepted because the 
welfare is higher in E2 than in E1. If this kind of rationing dominates the observations in our 
sample, we will see a drop in the demand among households in apartments with controlled 
rent compared to households (with same characteristics) in the uncontrolled market sector 
who on average will consume h1. However, if controlled housing is offered amply, the picture 
of panel b occurs, and households in apartments with rent control occupy more housing than 
they would on the market sector without rent control. Panel b of figure 2 shows a case where 
rent controlled housing is offered amply compared to housing without rent control. 
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Table 6: Paid rent compared to market rent per square meter 
Type of rental housing 




Difference as per cent 
of market rent  
- supported housing  484.2  567.9  -14.7 
- controlled rent  475.9  545.4  -12.7 
- damped rent  476.6  491.8  -3.3 
Notes: See also figure 2. Rents are the average annual rent in DKK per square meter for each sector in year 1999. 
1) Calculated rent for the cleaned sample by use of the coefficients in table 3. The difference in the paid rent 
between the sectors depends both on the design of the control system and on the specific characteristics of the 
dwellings. 
 
To look into this, we first calculate the average predicted (market) rent per square meter, 
following the estimated equation of table 3, for the rent controlled sectors, and compare this 
with the average rent per square meter actually paid in the sectors. Table 6 shows the result. 
As expected, actual rents paid in the controlled sectors are lower than the free market rent for 
similar dwellings. The difference is largest for supported housing with a paid rent per square 
meter, which is 14.7 per cent under the rent, had the square meters been offered on the free 
market. Also for controlled private letting is there a clear difference, whereas rental housing 
with damped rent seems to have a rent more in line with the market rent. Skifter Andersen 
(2008) interviewed 385 private landlords with properties containing 3 and more dwellings, 
who on average predicted a 10 per cent increase in rents if control was abolished. Our 
estimates are broadly in line with this. In relation to figure 2, the table confirms that rents in 
controlled sectors of the market are below the free market rent as shown by the slope of the 
budget lines in the figure. 
Figure 3 shows the kernel density functions for the estimated rents in the controlled sector and 
the density function for the actual rents in the market sector. The figure demonstrates that the 
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Figure 3: Density of estimated rents for controlled sectors and actual rents for the market 
sector 
 
Notes: The figure shows the density of estimated rents by use of the coefficients in table 3 for the three market 
sectors with supported housing, with controlled rent and with damped rent, and the density of actual rents for 
dwellings in the market sector. 
 
In order to show the number of allocated square meters hc compared to the quantity demanded 
h3 under controlled rent, h3 is calculated in table 7 by use of the estimated relation in table 4. 
Thus, it is assumed in table 7 that the regression based on market sector observations reveals 
the demand for square meters area for households in other sectors. The table shows that 
neither in supported housing nor in private controlled rental housing are households on 
average allocated a number of square meters that surpasses the quantity demanded under 
controlled rent. In the sector with damped rent, allocations are more in line with the quantity 
demanded, but with an average overallocation of 2.3 per cent. With reference to the figure 2, 
the number of allocated square meters hc is on average lower than the demanded number of 
square meters h3 in supported and private controlled housing, but slightly higher than the 
quantity demanded in the sector with damped rent. 
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Table 7: Actual allocation and demanded amount of square meters 









- supported housing  76.23  79.57  -4.2 
- controlled rent  72.92  77.28  -5.6 
- damped rent  79.70  77.90  2.3 
Notes: See also figure 2. The table shows the average number of square meters area. 1) Calculated quantity 
demanded for the cleaned sample by use of coefficients from table 4. 2) Per cent of calculated quantity 
demanded. 
 
A final exercise is to compare hc and h1 in figure 2, i.e. the allocated number of square meters 
compared to the quantity demanded had the square meters been offered in the sector with 
market rent. The market rent is estimated by use of the coefficients in table 3 and with this, 
the quantity demanded h1 is calculated by the use of the coefficients in table 4. The increase of 
the rent from controlled to market rent should by itself reduce the quantity demanded. But, as 
table 8 reveals, restrictions on the offered number of square meters in supported housing
12 has 
the consequence that allocations do not differ much from the quantity demanded, had the 
square meters been offered on the sector with market rent. This corresponds to panel b of 
figure 2, where hc lies to the right of h1, but to the left of h3. The private rent controlled sector 
is also pictures in panel b. The explanation behind the lack of overallocation in this sector 
must be that the low rent makes the housing units so attractive that households accept fewer 
square meters than the quantity demanded, but still get a welfare gain compared to renting in 
the uncontrolled sector of the market. Finally, the sector with damped rent has hc to the right 
of h3 and so even further away from h1. Here the average overallocation is 6.4 per cent. 
One should also expect to find incidences of overallocation in the market sector when 
calculated as in table 6. Part of this is caused by discontinuities of the supplied number of 
square meters with the consequence that a number of households in demand for housing will 
have to accept more or fewer square meters than demanded at the offered rent. However, it 
seems reasonable to assume that a market with no control is better to meet idiosyncratic 
differences between the households than a system with control and administrative or random 
                                                 
12 In supported housing, a single person is offered an apartment with two rooms. Three rooms may be offered to 
married or cohabitating couples if so decided by the local supported housing department. Apart from this, three 
and more rooms are reserved for households with children. Furthermore, low income households can apply for 
public support for an entrance deposit. Most supported housing departments have waiting lists for new tenants, 
but allow internal rotation between incumbents before admission of new tenants.   19
allocation. Hence, a big part of a calculated overallocation in the market rent sector is not 
welfare reducing overallocation, but a reflection of idiosyncratic household differences.  In 
the rent controlled sectors we postulate a welfare reducing misallocation if the allocated 
square meters exceed the individual household’s quantity demanded under an uncontrolled 
rent for the dwelling. 
Table 8: Actual allocation and demanded amount of square meters at market rent 









- supported housing  76.23  75.69  0.8 
- controlled rent  72.92  72.47  0.6 
- damped rent  79.70  74.58  6.4 
Notes: See also figure 2. The table shows the average number of square meter area. 1) Calculated quantity 
demanded for the cleaned sample by use of coefficients from table 4 and uncontrolled market rents estimated by 
use of coefficients from table 3. 2) Per cent of calculated quantity demanded at market rent. 
 
To give an impression of the degree of welfare reducing overallocation, we calculate the 
number of over- and underallocated square meters for all households in table 9 using the same 
technique as in table 8. We have also included a column for the market sector in the table to 
illustrate the calculations for this sector. But based on the reasoning above, we do not consider 
the overallocation in this sector as welfare reducing overallocation. Among the rent controlled 
sectors, the amount of overallocation ranges between 9.4 and 16.4 per cent of actual 
allocations, with the highest degree of overallocation found in the sector with damped rent. 










Actual allocations   6 149 816  1 811 565  631 725  332 645 
Sum of underallocations  525 102   204 470  63 868  28 346 
Sum of overallocations  577 498   211 534  103 700  40 959 
Net overallocations  52 396  7064  39 832  12 613 
Overallocations, per cent
1) 9.4  11.7  16.4  12.3 
Notes: 1) Per cent of actual allocation. 
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Potentially, all overallocations under rent control are welfare reducing, but we cannot exclude 
that part of the overallocation is given to households with an idiosyncratic high preference for 
housing, which is not captured by the control variables in our estimations. But it is also so that 
the result in table 9 covers a number of individual and in the public eye scandalous 
overallocations in the controlled market sectors. In order to give an impression of this, we 
have calculated the mean overallocation among households who have overallocation of square 
meters, see table 10.  
Table 10: Mean under and overallocation of square meters area per under and overallocated 










Actual  allocations  76.23 72.92 79.70 73.87 
Under  allocated  households  13.31 14.63 16.06 12.82 
Over allocated households
1)  14.64(19) 19.09(26) 25.95(33)  17.87 
20 per cent most over allocated
1)  31.94(42) 53.18(73) 73.01(92)  47.84 
Welfare loss from overallocation
2)  612.7(1.7) 663.4(1.9) 197.2(0.5)   
Welfare loss from overallocation among 
the 20 per cent most overallocated
2)  1336.7(3.6) 1848.0(5.3)  554.9(1.5)   
Note: Mean allocations per household in all dwellings, in under and overallocated dwellings, and the mean 
among the 20 per cent most overallocated households. 1) Per cent of actual allocations for the average household 
in the bracket. 2) Kroner per year and per cent of annual rent for the average household in the bracket. 
 
The table repeats the picture of table 9. Most overallocation is found in the sector with 
damped rent. Among the 20 per cent most overallocated households, it amounts to 42 per cent 
for supported housing, increasing to 92 per cent or close to a doubling of the average size in 
the sector with damped rent. 
Table 10 also contains a crude calculation of the welfare loss per households from 
overallocation. Taking the sector with damped rent, the calculation is the following: 
households are assumed to value the last allocated square meter to 476.6 kroner
13, see table 6. 
The households are on average overallocated 25.95 square meters. Therefore, with 25.95 
square meters less they value the marginal square meter to the free market rent, i.e. 491.8 
kroner. The market value for each of the 25.95 square meters is 491.8 kroner. With a linear 
                                                 
13 This is an approximation; table 7 reveals that the valuation is on average lower for overallocated households in 
the sector with damped rent. It is higher in supported housing and the sector with controlled rent.   21
demand curve, the welfare loss can be calculated as the area of a triangle above the demand 
curve equal to ½(491.8-476.6)25.95 = 197.2 kroner or ½ per cent of the annual rent for the 
dwelling of an average household in the sector
14. The welfare loss is influenced by the 
difference between the controlled rent and the market rent and this has the implication that 
now the private rent controlled sector comes in front with the highest welfare loss. For the 20 
per cent most overallocated households in this sector, the welfare loss is 5.3 per cent of the 
average annual rent. 
6. Conclusion 
Misallocation is expected in rent controlled housing because households who value housing 
most may not be allocated the dwellings. No rental housing sector, controlled or uncontrolled 
can offer every household exactly the demanded number of square meters. Discontinuities of 
supply, asymmetries of information and transaction costs have the consequence that 
incidences of over- and underallocation of square meters can be found in all sectors of the 
market. However, with rent control applied in a sector of a homogenous rental housing market 
only overallocation among households in controlled dwellings should be counted as welfare 
reducing misallocation. 
Our method differs from the estimations done by Glaeser and Luttmer (2003) for the New 
York City. They compare rental markets between metropolitan areas with and without rent 
control and estimate that approximately 20 per cent of all apartments in the New York City 
are overallocated in terms of number of rooms. We take the actual segregation of the Danish 
rental housing market as the basis for the analyses and calculate welfare reducing 
overallocation among households in controlled housing units as the surplus of actual 
allocation of square meters minus the quantity demanded, had the square meters been offered 
on the free market rent sector. We find no tendency for net overallocation in supported 
housing and in the private rent controlled sector of the market, and explain this partly with a 
restrictive administrative allocation system in supported housing, and partly because the low 
rent in controlled sectors may make the dwellings so attractive that households accept fewer 
square meters than the quantity demanded, and still get a welfare gain compared to renting on 
the free market. However we find welfare reducing overallocation in the controlled sectors 
between 9 and 17 per cent of actual allocations. Looking at the 20 per cent most overallocated 
                                                 
14 Adding up to the country level, the welfare loss from overallocation is approximately 12 mill kroner per year 
in this sector.   22
households; we find overallocations of square meters ranging between 42 and 92 per cent of 
the average allocation per household, and estimate the corresponding welfare losses to be 
from 1.5 to 5.3 per cent of the average annual rent in the sectors. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Variable description 
Name Type  Description 
Area per household  continuous  square meters of dwelling area 
Ln of area  continuous  natural logarithm of area per household 
Rent per sqm.  continuous  rent in DKK per square meter per year 
Ln rent per sqm.  continuous  natural logarithm of rent per sqm 
Age of building  continuous  age of building in years 
Age of building squared  continuous  squared age 
Attached  dummy  dwelling is in an attached building 
Detached  dummy  dwelling is in a detached building 
Semi detached  dummy  dwelling is in a semi detached building 
Length of tenure  continuous  length of tenure in years for the person with highest length 
Square of  length of tenure  continuous  square of length of tenure 
Income per equivalent person  continuous  total household disposable income divided by number of 
equivalent persons  
Ln income per equivalent person  continuous  natural logarithm of income per equivalent person 
Number of equivalent persons  continuous  (number of adults + 0.6 times the number of children)^0.8 
Square of  number of equivalent 
persons 
continuous  square of number of equivalent persons 
Age or breadwinner  continuous  age of breadwinner 
Age or breadwinner squared  continuous  square of age of breadwinner 
No education  dummy  breadwinner has no education 
Short education  dummy  breadwinner has short education 
Long education  dummy  breadwinner has long education 
Wage earner  dummy  breadwinner is wage-earner 
Self employed  dummy  breadwinner is self-employed 
Undergoing education  dummy  breadwinner is under education 
Pre pensioner  dummy  breadwinner is under pre pension 
Social pensioner  dummy  breadwinner receives social pension 
Early pensioner  dummy  breadwinner is early pensioner 
Old age pensioner  dummy  breadwinner is old age pensioner 
Immigrant  dummy  breadwinner is immigrant 
Single  dummy  breadwinner is single 
Married  dummy  breadwinner is married 
Divorced  dummy  breadwinner is divorced 
Widow  dummy  breadwinner is widow/-er 
Completely urbanized  dummy  urbanization degree
1 95 – 100% 
Highly urbanized  dummy  urbanization degree 80 – 95% 
Medium  urbanized  dummy  urbanization degree 55 – 80% 
Low urbanized  dummy  urbanization degree 0 – 55% 
Built-up roof  dummy  building has built-up roofing and/or  roofing felt 
Vacancy rate  continuous  share of vacant dwellings in municipality, % 
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics for the 20 per cent random sample minus the sector with coop 
ownership 
Name Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Rent per sqm.  126,114  487.57  337.92  23.15  47661.5 
Ln of rent per sqm.  126,114  6.14  0.29  3.14  10.77 
Area per household  163,673  80.38  38.57  18  3450 
Ln of  area  163,673  4.31  0.39  2.89  8.15 
Age of building  160,930  48.0  36.30  1  499 
Attached 164,291  0.72  0.45  0  1 
Detached 164,291  0.09  0.29  0  1 
Semidetached 164,291  0.19  0.39  0  1 
Length of tenure  164,291  12.5  17.13  1  102 
Income per equivalent person  163,719  167,064.8  176,235.2  1  9,853,900 
Ln of income   164,291  11.82  0.60  0  16.10 
Equivalent persons  164,291  1.48  0.63  1  18.4 
Age of breadwinner  164,291  48.27  19.38  0  113 
No education   164,291  0.54  0.50  0  1 
Short education  164,291  0.36  0.48  0  1 
Long education  164,291  0.10  0.30  0  1 
Wage earner  164,291  0.49  0.50  0  1 
Self employed  164,291  0.02  0.15  0  1 
Undergoing education  164,291  0.03  0.16  0  1 
Pre pensioner   164,291  0.10  0.30  0  1 
Social pensioner  164,291  0.06  0.23  0  1 
Early retirement  164,291  0.03  0.17  0  1 
Old age pensioner  164,291  0.21  0.41  0  1 
Immigrant 164,291  0.10  0.30  0  1 
Single 164,291  0.41  0.50  0  1 
Married 164,291  0.28  0.45  0  1 
Divorced 164,291  0.18  0.39  0  1 
Widow 164,291  0.13  0.34  0  1 
Completely urbanized  164,291  0.55  0.50  0  1 
Highly urbanized  164,291  0.24  0.43  0  1 
Medium  urbanized  164,291  0.18  0.39  0  1 
Low urbanized  164,291  0.03  0.16  0  1 
Built-up roof  162,321  0.19  0.39  0  1 
Vacancy rate  164,291  6.14 2.49 1.2  23.8 
 